The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria
It is commonly believed that in repeated games where the threat of punishment is credible and immediate and future cooperation is collectively desirable, the more the players value their future interactions (the greater is the discounted benefit of future cooperation) the more likely cooperation will be the equilibrium. In these games cooperation is immediate and e.g. a trigger strategy can be designed to continue that cooperation into the future. This works nicely when there is an agreed upon outcome that is best for everyone (e.g. prisoner's dilemma), where cooperation backed up by credible equilibrium threats elicit cooperation. 1 The threat of conflict thus enforces cooperative relations. The approach in this article is different. "Cooperation" is not immediate. One player is trying to get his preferred equilibrium at the expense of the other. There is fundamental disagreement as to what is the best equilibrium. In addition, a player, by challenging the other player, is trying to induce him to give in to choosing the other equilibrium.
Consider the game in Table 1 where
The two pure strategy equilibria are (a 1 ,a 2 ) and (b 1 ,b 2 ). Row player 1 prefers (a 1 ,a 2 ), and column player 2 prefers (b 1 ,b 2 ).
3
Consider a "trigger strategy" (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994:143-154) for player 2 where the players move simultaneously in each period and a challenge lasts only two periods. In period 0 player 1 gets to know that he is challenged, and in period 1 player 2 gets to know whether player 1 resists or acquiesces: Assume play of (I,I) in Table 1 in period −1 giving (a 1 ,a 2 ) and that player 1 also chooses I in period 0. Challenge player 1 in periods 0 and 1 if player 1 chooses strategy I in periods −1 and 0. This gives (t 1 ,t 2 )in period 0. If player 1 resists in period 1 giving (t 1 ,t 2 ), then revert to strategy I giving (a 1 ,a 2 ). If player 1 acquiesces in period 1, then continue with strategy II giving (b 1 ,b 2 ) until player 1 reverts back to strategy I. Rapoport and Guyer's (1966:213) ordinal taxonomy. The most well-known of these are the Battle of the Sexes (game 68), Chicken (game 66), and game 69 with several names such as "Let George do it", "Apology", "Hero", "Sacrificed leader". The games 64, 65, 67 are hybrid asymmetric games. 3 In the finitely and infinitely repeated versions of the game in Table 1 the two Nash equilibria are subgame perfect. In the infinitely repeated game the following two strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium with payoff (a 1 ,a 2 ) in each period: Player 1: Choose strategy I when challenged, unless strategy 2 was chosen in the past, then always choose strategy II. Player 2: Choose strategy I unless player 1 failed to choose strategy I in the past, then always choose strategy II. The justification for the subgame perfect equilibrium with payoff (b 1 ,b 2 ) in each period is analogous. For these two subgame perfect equilibria one player acquires a reputation for recalcitrance, the other for acquiescence. One problem with these two equilibria is that the reputation is never tested. Table 1 is equivalent to the probably most well-known example of entry deterrence, viz. the chain store game on normal form, when
where player 1 is the incumbent (fight = strategy I, acquiesce = strategy II) and player 2 the entrant (stay out = strategy I, enter = strategy II). Both games have the same two Nash equilibria, but the chain store game in its finitely repeated version has only one unique subgame perfect equilibrium (proved by backward induction); the entrant enters and the incumbent does not fight. Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) were first to formalize reputation effects, where a small amount of incomplete information can be sufficient to overcome Selten's (1978) chain store paradox. As Kreps and Wilson (1982:255) point out, the second equilibrium (the entrant stays out and the incumbent chooses the strategy "fight if entry")is"imperfect" and "not so plausible as the first. It depends on an expectation by the entrant of the bincumbent'sN behavior that, faced with the fait accompli of entry, would be irrational behavior for the bincumbentN." For text book treatments see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991:369-374) , Osborne and Rubinstein (1994:105-106,239-243) , Rasmusen (1989 Rasmusen ( :85-118, 2001 , Wilson (1985:31-33) .
In an infinitely repeated game with discount factors δ 1 and δ 2 for players 1 and 2, respectively, where player 1 resists, players 1 and 2 get
respectively. If player 1 acquiesces, they get
Player 1 resists in period 1 when his payoff in (1) is larger than that of (3), i.e.
According to (5) player 1 is more likely to resist the more important the future is. In order for player 2's challenge in period 0 to be part of a subgame perfect equilibrium, her expected payoff from challenging must be larger than the payoff a 2 /(1 − δ 2 ) of not challenging. For this calculation player 2 needs to make a conjecture of the probability q 1 that player 1 resists the challenge. Applying (2) and (4) player 2 challenges in period 0 when
Eqs. (5) and (6) imply that if sufficiently low weight is placed on the future (δ i is small, i = 1,2), player 2 does not challenge, and neither does player 1 resist if there were a challenge, implying "peace" at (a 1 ,a 2 ). Satisfaction of (5) but not (6) implies that player 2 does not challenge, implying (a 1 ,a 2 ). Conversely, satisfaction of (6) but not (5) implies that player 2 challenges and player 1 acquiesces, implying "peace" at (b 1 ,b 2 ). Finally, if sufficiently high weight is placed on the future (δ i is large), player 2 challenges and player 1 resists, implying conflict at (t 1 ,t 2 ). Proof. Follows from (5) and (6).
□
Proposition 2. δ 2 ⁎ = (a 2 − t 2 ) / (b 2 − t 2 ) when q 1 = 0, and δ 2 ⁎ = 1 when q 1 = 1.
Proof. Follows from (6) applying L'Hopital's rule for the first equality. □ Proposition 3. If q 1 b 1 and a 2 b b 2 and δ i is sufficiently large, i = 1,2, the threat point (t 1 ,t 2 ) is guaranteed.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 1 and 2. □ Proposition 3 states that if the future is sufficiently important, and player 2 estimates that player 1 is not 100% guaranteed to resist, then conflict is guaranteed. In other words, given that player 2 estimates at least a minuscule probability that player 1 acquiesces, sufficiently large emphasis on the future by both players makes conflict inevitable. Fig. 1 illustrates the four areas in Proposition 1 assuming (a 1 ,a 2 ) = (4,3), (b 1 ,b 2 ) = (3,4), (t 1 ,t 2 ) = (0,2). The horizontal axis is the probability q 1 estimated by player 2 that player 1 resists the challenge. The vertical axis is the discount factor δ i which may be different for players 1 and 2. This means that one for each value of q 1 can choose one value δ 1 along the vertical axis for player 1's discount factor, and another value δ 2 along the vertical axis for player 2's discount factor, and read the optimal strategy and payoff for each player out of the diagram. For expositional convenience we focus on one value along the vertical axis, which is sufficient since all the four areas are present.
When q 1 = 1, which means that player 2 estimates that player 1 is guaranteed to resist, then player 2 is best off not challenging, regardless of her discount factor, as specified in Proposition 2. Conversely, when q 1 = 0, which means that player 2 estimates that player 1 is guaranteed not to resist, then player 2 may Fig. 1 . The four areas in Proposition 1 dependent on the probability q 1 estimated by player 2 that player 1 resists the challenge, and the discount factor δ i , i = 1,2 for both players. The payoffs within each area are shown in brackets.
challenge if the discount factor is large compared with the threat payoff t 2 that has to be endured in period 0 because of the challenge, see (4). Hence when q 1 = 0 and a 2 b b 2 , δ 2 ⁎ b 1 in accordance with Proposition 2. Fig. 1 shows how δ 2 ⁎ increases in q 1 , while δ 1 ⁎ is constant in accordance with (5).
Below the curve δ 2 ⁎ in Fig. 1 , the behavior of player 1 is irrelevant since player 2 does not challenge, which always causes (a 1 ,a 2 ). However, above the curve δ 2 ⁎ , the threat point (t 1 ,t 2 ) follows if player 1 resists, while (b 1 ,b 2 ) follows if player 1 acquiesces. When the parameters in (5) are adjusted so that δ 1 ⁎ decreases, Fig. 1 reduces to three areas making (b 1 ,b 2 ) impossible. For example, increasing t 1 from t 1 = 0 to t 1 = 2 causes δ 1 ⁎ = 1/2 and three areas.
The development above assumes that player 2 challenges the equilibrium (a 1 ,a 2 ). The development is analogous when player 1 challenges the equilibrium (b 1 ,b 2 ). In that case player 1 estimates a probability q 2 that player 2 resists the challenge.
Conflict at the threat point (t 1 ,t 2 ) raises the question of whether the off-the-equilibrium-path conjectures the players make of q 2 and q 1 , and of each others' trigger strategies, when located in (I,II) (which is not an equilibrium) in period 1 receiving (t 1 ,t 2 ) are incompatible. Eq. (5) assumes that player 1 knows player 2's trigger strategy of acquiescing when player 1 resists. Knowing this conjecture, and assuming that (5) is satisfied, player 2 may rationally conjecture that player 1 is certain to resist, that is estimate q 1 = 1, which when inserted into (6) gives δ 2 N 1. Hence player 2 does not challenge if player 1 is deemed certain to resist. This again ensures "peace" at (a 1 ,a 2 ). But deeming player 1 certain to resist is problematic. It means that player 1 commits in advance to the sequence of actions he will take. If sufficiently challenged it is not rational for player 1 to keep such a commitment. Neither are the remedies suggested by Schelling (1960) for ensuring that one's commitment is trustworthy present in this complete information game, 5 and neither are there any salient focal points. The analysis suggests on one hand that sufficiently high weight on the future increases the likelihood of conflict. But on the other hand, this presupposes that incompatible and sufficiently low off-the-equilibrium-path conjectures are admissible. The players are forced to play the game and cannot bargain themselves out of the game. Although the game has complete information, the players may well choose to resolve their situation by resorting to incompatible conjectures.
